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I will argue that the standard formulation of non-factualism in terms of a denial of
truth-aptness is consistent with a version of deationsim. My line of argument as-
sumes the use conception of meaning. is brings out an interesting consequence
sincemostly the philosophers who endorse the use conception ofmeaning, e.g. Paul
Horwich, hold that deationism is inconsistent with the strategy of implementing
non-factualism in terms of a denial of truth-aptness and thereby urge a reformula-
tion of non-factualism
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1. Introduction
Ontological and epistemological considerations make some kinds of facts—
e.g. ethical facts, aesthetic facts,modal facts,mathematical facts—seemweird
and problematic to some philosophers. As a result, those philosophers at-
tempt to avoid any commitment to such facts. Since facts are taken to be
what sentences or propositions describe (or at worst misdescribe), one gen-
eral form of response is to hold that sentences or propositions are not fact
stating in those problematic regions of discourse. Nonfactualism is the view
that sentences or propositions are not used to describe facts in certain re-
gions of discourse. One standard strategy of implementing non-factualism
is to deny that sentences or propositions are truth-apt in the problematic
regions of discourse. e idea is that there is no reality behind our thought
and talk, thereby no facts of thematter upon which the truth or falsity of our
thoughts and sentences might depend. In other words, in the problematic
regions of discourse the correctness of sentences or propositions does not
consist in being true descriptions of any real aspect of the world.
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Horwich (1990, 2006)1 has claimed that deationism is not consistent
with the standard strategy of implementing non-factualism, because even in
the disputed regions of discourse, sentences exhibit all the features of mean-
ingful sentences.ey possess standards of correctness and are embeddable
in logical operations and indirect contexts. According to deationism, to
have these features is a sucient condition for being truth-apt. As a result
and contrary to the standard formulation of non-factualism, also those sen-
tences should be counted as truth-apt.
In the same vein, Scott Soames (1997) has argued that the inconsistency
with the standard strategy of implementing non-factualism is a consequence
of any acceptable conception of truth, not only of deationism. He illustrates
the point by the following example of a hypothetical position that, he says,
conicts with deationism. Take a philosopher who (i) holds that sentences
like ‘act A is wrong’ in ethics are meaningful, (ii) is willing to assert some of
these sentences, and (iii) denies that sentences are truth-apt in ethics. e
philosopher will be disposed to assert sentences like
(a) John asserted ‘act A is wrong’.
Given (ii), the philosopher will be disposed to assert sentences like
(b) Act A is wrong.
Given (iii), the philosopher will not be disposed to assert sentences like
(c) What John asserted—namely ‘act A is wrong’—is true.
e philosopher’s position certainly conicts with deationism, since,
Soames says, acceptance of (a) and (b) commits one to accepting (c). But the
fact that the premises (a) and (b) force the conclusion (c) has nothing specic
to dowith deationism. Indeed, the conict ariseswith all those conceptions
of truth according to which all the instances of the disquotational schema
(except those that are paradoxical or pathological) are true. In fact, from
the truth of the instances of the disquotational schema, one who asserts (b)
ought not to refuse to infer
(b*) ‘Act A is wrong’ is true
and he ought not to refuse to reach the conclusion
(c) What John asserted—namely ‘act A is wrong’—is true
1 See also Boghossian (1990) for a similar argument.
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which contrasts with what the philosopher is willing to assert.
Soames concludes that the conict arises with any reasonable concep-
tion of truth, since any reasonable conception of truth must acknowledge
that all the instances of the disquotational schema (except those that are
paradoxical or pathological) are true. So, if one is willing to assert p, then
he ought not to refuse to give his assent to ⌜p is true⌝. According to Soames,
there is no special relationship between deationism and non-factualism.
Standard non-factualism is implausible in light of any reasonable concep-
tion of truth.
I will argue that Horwich is wrong, and a fortiori Soames is wrong too.
My claim is that the standard strategy of implementing non-factualism is
consistent with deationism, or better with a version of deationism, and
a fortiori it is consistent with at least one conception of truth. In order to
give support to my claim I will endorse Horwich’s use conception of mean-
ing. is brings out an interesting consequence. Indeed, Horwich suggests
that we ought to reformulate non-factualism in order to avoid the contrast
with deationism. I will not be concerned with his proposed reformula-
tion. Rather, I will follow the opposite strategy: to avoid contrast with non-
factualism we have to reformulate deationism. I will show that a combi-
nation of the use conception of meaning, which Horwich professes, with a
version of deationism is compatible with the standard formulation of non-
factualism to the extent that a distinction can be laid down between genuine
descriptions and sentences whose role is non-descriptive.
More specically, I will argue that it is coherent for a speaker to accept
the sentence p without being committed to accepting the sentence ⌜p is
true⌝, if p does not have a descriptive role. is seems to impose at least
a renement of the view that all the instances of the disquotational schema
are true. To make the point clearer, consider Soames’ argument for the con-
clusion that the philosopher, who is willing to assert (a) and (b), must accept
(c). My point is that Soames’ claim that the instance of the disquotational
schema
‘act A is wrong’ is true if and only if act A is wrong
is true begs the question at issue.2 e non-factualist philosopher envisaged
by Soames might reply that all the instances of the disquotational schema⌜p⌝ is true if and only if p are true on condition that the sentences that are
substituted for the schematic letter p are truth-apt. Likewise, onemight take
it for granted that the following inference schema is valid:
2 is point is stressed by Richard (1997, 63).
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p
erefore⌜p⌝ is true.
e point is that to say that the premises of an inference entail its conclusion
is to say that, necessarily, i f the premises are true, then the conclusion is
true as well. So, the non-factualist philosopher might (i) concede that the
inference schema is valid and (ii) be willing to assert the premise ‘act A is
wrong’ without being committed to the truth of the conclusion “‘act A is
wrong” is true’, since he does not agree that the premise is truth-apt.
I wish to make it clear that my aim in this paper is not to prove that non-
factualism is true in this or that region of discourse, but to show that the stan-
dard strategy of implementing non-factualism is a coherent philosophical
view and consistent with deationism. I concede that non-factualismmight
be false, or that there might be no good reasons for turning non-factualists,
yet non-factualism is not incoherent.
Before going further, it will be helpful to sketch an example of the philo-
sophical position I have in mind. Consider a philosopher who is willing to
assert mathematical sentences, but does not admit numbers in his ontol-
ogy.3 He utters mathematical sentences as disciplined by standards of cor-
rectness, and he is willing to reason from them, to embed them in logical
operations and in indirect discourse, to argue that others ought to accept
them. We can also think of his behaviour as being motivationally led by
acceptance of mathematical sentences. For example, he refuses to pay the
restaurant bill because he does not accept the sentence ‘9,50 + 8,50 = 19’ and
wants to convince the waiter to accept the sentence ‘9,50 + 8,50 = 18’.4 In
addition, suppose the philosopher in question endorses Horwich’s concep-
tion of meaning.en he will acknowledge that mathematical sentences are
meaningful. He will also acknowledge that the acceptance of sentences ac-
quires the psychological role that the states of belief ought to have.5 en,
the philosopher will agree that the cognitive states one is in while asserting
mathematical sentences play the same motivational role as beliefs. How-
ever, the philosopher might insist that he does not admit numbers in his
ontology and consequently that he is not committed to the truth-aptness of
mathematical sentences. e philosopher denies that there is anything in
the world in which the condition for the truth of mathematical sentences
3 ink, for example, of a nominalist philosopher who holds that although mathematical
sentences do not describe any part of the world, they are necessary for shortening proofs
in physics and other sciences.
4 is example is similar to one discussed by Richard (1997, 60).
5 Horwich tends to identify belief and acceptance of sentences. See, for example, Horwich
(1991).
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consists, since he does not take numbers to be part of the world. ere are
no facts of thematter as to whether mathematical sentences are true or false.
In sum, if p is a mathematical sentence, the philosopher might be willing to
assert p but not ⌜p is true⌝. For example, the philosopher will assert ‘9,50 +
8,50 = 18’ in order to convince the waiter to withdraw the request for the bill
to be paid, but he will not assert “‘9,50 + 8,50 = 18” is true’.
My claim, then, is that this philosophical position combining Horwich’s
use conception of meaning with standard non-factualism is consistent with
deationism. In the next section, I will discuss two aspects of Horwich’s
conception of meaning that are relevant for my line of argument.
2. Use and deationsim
I will argue that the use conception of meaning gives support to a version of
deationism that poses a constraint on the disquotational schema to such an
extent that the sentences containing expressions lacking a truth-theoretic se-
mantic value (i.e. objects for singular terms, n-ary properties for n-ary pred-
icates; henceforth I will call such sentences “semantically defective”) are not
truth-apt, despite their meaningfulness and their being suitable for asser-
tion. My claim is that, if p is a sentence containing some empty expression,
one can consistently assert p and deny his assent to ⌜p is true⌝.
In this section, I will appeal to Horwich’s conception of meaning as a
paradigm of the view that meaning properties are constituted by regularities
of use. Specically, I wish to underline two aspects of Horwich’s view. e
rst is that it allows for a denition of synonymy and the second is that it
oers a notion of meaning avoiding any truth-theoretic notions. In the next
section, I will employ both aspects to present a version of deationism that,
I claim, is consistent with the standard formulation of non-factualism.
According toHorwich’s use conception ofmeaning, the property of hav-
ing a certain meaning is constituted by the property of being governed by
certain basic and explanatorily fundamental patterns of use. In general, for
each expression w there is a regularity of the form
All uses of w stem from its possession of the acceptance property
A(w), where A(w) species the circumstances in which certain sen-
tences containing w are accepted.6
6 For example: e acceptance property that governs a speaker’s overall use of ‘and’ is his
tendency to accept ⌜p and q⌝ if and only if he accepts both, ⌜p⌝ and ⌜q⌝. ‘red”s meaning
stems from our underived propensity to accept ‘that is red’ in response to the sort of visual
experience normally provoked by observing a clearly red surface. Cf. Horwich (1998, 45).
According toHorwich (2004), themeaning constitutive regularities of use are individuated
as those regularities which play a basic and explanatorily fundamental role with respect of
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One might think that a denition of synonymy can be extracted from this
conception of meaning.
For any L, L∗, x, y (x in L is synonymous with y in L∗ if and only if
the overall use of x in L is governed by the same acceptance properties
as the overall use of y in L∗).
As it stands, this denition does not work. It has been argued7 that there
are no acceptance properties that are constitutive of the meanings of com-
pound expressions. If there were, they ought to be compositional, but accep-
tance properties of compound expressions are not compositional. In order
to cope with this diculty, Horwich (2005) suggests distinguishing two or-
ders of facts that are constitutive of meaning properties. Meaning properties
of simple expressions are constituted by facts concerning their acceptance
properties. Meaning properties of compound expressions are constituted by
the fact that they are composed in accordance with certain syntactic struc-
tures from simple expressions having certain acceptance properties. Follow-
ingHorwich’s suggestion, wemight distinguish two denitions of synonymy,
one for simple expressions and the other for compound expressions (‘SL(x)’
means that x is a simple expression of L and ‘CL(x)’ means that x is a com-
pound expression of L):
(1) For any L, L∗, x, y (if SL(x) and SL∗(y) then (x in L is synonymous
with y in L∗ if and only if the overall use of x in L is governed by
the same acceptance properties as the overall use of y in L∗)).
(2) For any L, L∗, x, y (if CL(x) and CL∗(y) then (x in L is synony-
mous with y in L∗ if and only if x has the same syntactic structure
as y and the overall use of each simple component of x in L is gov-
erned by the same acceptance properties as the overall use of the
corresponding simple component of y in L∗)).
e other aspect of Horwich’s view I wish to underline is the idea that truth-
theoretic notions are not constitutive of meaning. Horwich’s view is that
linguistic competence is constituted by (implicit) knowledge of regularities
of use of linguistic expressions. So, the theory that describes the meaning
constitutive patterns of use is still taken as a theoretical representation of
linguistic competence. But a theory of meaning inspired by Horwich’s use
conception describes the patterns of use that are meaning-constitutive with-
out employing truth-theoretic notions. Horwich (1998, 73) holds that a sen-
tence’s truth condition is a consequence of its meaning, not constitutive of
the overall usage of expressions and such that (expert) speakers conform to them without
needing or even having the possibility of a justication.
7 See Fodor and Lepore (1991, 1996).
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it. Specically, our knowledge of a sentence’s truth condition is the product
of (i) our knowledge of its meaning and (ii) our knowledge of a deationary
theory of truth-theoretic notions. Together they allow for the derivations
of the instances of the T-schema. In so far as we understand all the con-
stituents of the instances of the T-schema, we can be said to know what they
state, namely the representational link between language and world.
I will appeal to the two aspects of Horwich’s conception of meaning just
discussed, namely the fact that it provides an account of synonymy and the
fact that it avoids truth-theoretic notions, for presenting a deationary view
of truth that is compatible with the standard formulation of non-factualism,
according towhich semantically defective sentences are not truth-apt and do
not qualify as fact stating.e approach I will present is a modied version
of the Tarskian theory of truth. Moreover, I will argue that such approach
qualies as deationary. First, I will show that the use conception of mean-
ing is suitable for defending the Tarskian conception of truth. en, I will
maintain that the modied Tarskian theory provides an account of truth
that restricts the validity of the instances of the disquotational schema to
sentences that are not semantically defective. So that if p is a semantically
defective sentence, one can consistently give his assent to p but not to ⌜p is
true⌝.
ConventionT says that we need to dene truth in L in such away that the
sentences of themetalanguage in the right-hand side of T-sentences must be
the translation of the sentences of the object-language in the le-hand side.
e notion of translation presupposes the notion of meaning. We cannot
speak of translation without speaking of correctness of translation, and a
translation is correct if and only if it is meaning preserving. It appears that if
we have to rely on the notion of meaning in xing the condition of material
adequacy for theories of truth, we cannot accept a notion ofmeaning spelled
out in terms of truth-conditions. It would be circular to use the notion of
meaning to construct an account of truth in L and at the same time to cash
the notion of meaning in terms that require an account of truth in L.We can
point out the circularity by the following reasoning.8
Convention T states that it is a sucient condition for an account of
truth to be materially adequate that it implies T-sentences in which the met-
alanguage sentences in the right-hand side are the translations of the object-
language sentences in the le-hand side. Hence, Convention T uses the two-
place meta-metalinguistic predicate ‘x is equivalent in meaning to y’, where
‘x’ ranges over the sentences of the object-language and ‘y’ over the sen-
tences of the metalanguage. But how should we explain the relation of being
equivalent in meaning? Any explanation according to which x is equiva-
8 I borrow this argument from Patterson (2002).
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lent in meaning to y if and only if x and y are true under the same condi-
tions would require that we already possess a truth predicate for the object-
language and the metalanguage in a meta-metalanguage. But if we are able
to dene truth in L in a meta-metalanguage, then we can already dene it in
a metalanguage, since the meta-metalanguage is a metalanguage.erefore,
Convention T would state what is needed to dene truth in L in a metalan-
guage only by assuming that we are already able to dene it in another met-
alanguage. If this were the correct interpretation of Convention T, then any
account of truth that is accepted insofar as it satises Convention T would
be deprived of its philosophical import. e account of a given notion pre-
serves its interest only if it does not presuppose the availability of another
account of the same notion. e upshot is that we cannot be content with
an account of truth for the reason that it is constructed in accordance with
Convention T and at the same timemaintain that the notion of meaning has
to be explained in terms of truth-conditions.
e conclusion is that Convention T not only requires the notion of
meaning, but also presupposes a conception ofmeaning other than the truth-
theoretic one. An alternative is to endorse some version of the use concep-
tion of meaning like Horwich’s. In the next section, I will sketch the guide-
lines of a deationary theory of truth that is consistent with the standard
formulation of non-factualism and based on the use conception of mean-
ing.
3. A deationary account of truth
It remains to be shown that we can construct a theory of truth according
to which semantically defective sentences are not truth-apt. e idea is to
present a theory that allows for truth-value gaps. e view that there are
truth-values gaps is not a novelty. Gottlob Frege (1982) suggested that sen-
tences containing expressions without referents express propositional con-
tents but do not possess any truth-value. Saul Kripke (1975) uses truth-value
gaps to provide a solution to the Liar Paradox. Scott Soames (1999) himself
embraces a similar solution. My proposal is to appeal to amodied Tarskian
theory of truth in L. First, I will sketch the guidelines of such theory and
then I will explain in which sense it qualies as a modied Tarskian theory
of truth in L that retains a deationary nature.
Let L be a fragment of English containing (i) singular terms, (ii)monadic
predicates and (iii) negation, conjunction and disjunction. e modied
Tarskian theory of truth in L can be sketched as follows:9
9 Of course, my sketch leaves a lot of work to be done. Here, for the sake of exposition, I
follow Soames’ (1984) very simplied presentation of the Tarskian theory of truth in L.
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Denition of reference:
For any singular term n of L and object o, n refers in L to o if and only
if n = ‘London’ and o = London or. . .
Denition of ascription:
For any predicate G of L and property P, G ascribes in L P if and only
if G = ‘is a capital’ and P = the property of being a capital or. . .
Denition of application:
For any predicate G of L, any object o, G applies in L to o if and only
if G = ‘is a capital’ and o is a capital or. . .
Denition of truth-aptness:
For any sentence S of L, S is truth-apt if and only if
S = Gn for some singular term n and monadic predicate G and there
are exactly one object o referred to by n and one property P ascribed
by G or
S = ∼A and A is truth-apt or
S = A∧ B and A is truth-apt and B is truth-apt or
S = A∨ B and A is truth-apt and B is truth-apt.
Denition of truth:
For any sentence S of L, S is true in L if and only if
S = Gn for some singular term n and monadic predicate G and S is
truth-apt and G applies to the object referred to by n or
S = ∼A and S is truth-apt and A is false or
S = A∧ B and S is truth-apt and A is true and B is true or
S = A∨ B and S is truth-apt and A is true or B is true.
Denition of falsity:
For any sentence S of L, S is false in L if and only if
S = Gn for some singular term n and monadic predicate G and S is
truth-apt and G does not apply to the object referred to by n or
S = ∼A and S is truth-apt and A is true or
S = A∧ B and S is truth-apt and A is false or B is false or
S = A∨ B and S is truth-apt and A is false and B is false.
It avoids quantiers and sequences and employs the notion of application instead of the
notion of satisfaction. I take technicalities not to add any substantial aspect to the main
point of the Tarskian approach, which is the denition of primitive semantic notions by
lists.
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Finally, we can state a denition of factuality:
For any sentence S of L, S is factual if and only if it is truth-apt.
Some comments are in order. First, the theory denes two sets of sentences,
those that are true and those that are false. ese sets are mutually exclu-
sive but not jointly exhaustive. Semantically defective sentences—sentences
containing singular terms that do not refer to anything or predicates that do
not ascribe any property—are not truth-apt and thereby are truth-valueless.
Second, I endorse the view that properties are the truth-theoretic seman-
tic values of predicates and that predicates stand in the semantic relation
of ascription10 to properties. is view is needed to provide standard non-
factualists with the resources for a global strategy for supporting their po-
sition. Indeed, standard non-factualists deny that the sentences in a given
disputed region of discourse are truth-apt since they deny that there are facts
that make them true or false. So, the reason why a sentence is not truth-apt
is that it is semantically defective, in the sense that some of its parts do not
have any truth-theoretic semantic value. e point is that endorsing stan-
dard non-factualism in certain regions of discourse seems to require that
predicates have properties as truth-theoretic semantic values.ink of sen-
tences in aesthetics, like ‘rhubarb is delicious’. e only plausible way to re-
gard the sentence ‘rhubarb is delicious’ as semantically defective is to take
‘is delicious’ as a predicate that does not ascribe any property, given that
certainly ‘rhubarb’ does have a truth-theoretic semantic value. e core of
non-factualism in aesthetics is that there are no aesthetic properties. at
is the reason why ‘is delicious’ does not ascribe any property and ‘rhubarb
is delicious’ is semantically defective. In general, as we are trying to explain
non-factuality of sentences by means of their being semantically defective,
we need to recognise truth-theoretic semantic values of predicates in order
to give non-factualism a formulation that can be extended to all regions of
discourse.
e third comment is about the enumerative denitions of reference, as-
cription and application. In this respect we can say that the proposed theory
of truth in L is Tarskian in spirit. It avoids conceptual analysis and reduc-
tion of primitive semantic notions. Moreover, the criterion that underlies
the construction of the denitions of reference, ascription and application
is guided by the same principle underlying Convention T.e principle that
guides the matching of the expressions of the object-language to the expres-
sions of themetalanguage is sameness ofmeaning. For instance, we can state
10 I borrow the notion of ascription from Wright (1998). Wright holds that properties can
be both referred to by singular terms like ‘the property of being a dog’ and ascribed by
predicates like ‘is a dog’.
94 Deflationism, Truth-Aptness and Non-Factualism
that ‘London’ refers in L to London because ‘London’ in L (the fragment of
English in our example) has the same meaning as ‘London’ in the metalan-
guage (English in our example). Mainly, it is this enumerative characteristic
that preserves the deationary nature of the modied Tarskian theory of
truth in L.
e enumerative characteristic notwithstanding, we can imagine some-
one accusing my proposal of not being deationary and presenting the fol-
lowing rejoinder. If non-factualism is a matter of semantic defectiveness,
then what determines whether all parts of a sentence have truth-theoretic
semantic values or not? If it is something of robust, such as a causal factor,
then it becomes dicult to view the resulting account of truth as deation-
ary. On the other hand, if having a semantic value is an appropriately thin
matter, then what meaningful sentences would turn out to be semantically
defective?
I reply to this objection as follows. First, it is worth nothing that although
deationism does not hold that truth consists in correspondence to facts, it
does not need to deny the view that truths correspond to facts. As Horwich
(1990, ch. 7) points out, the reasoning that leads to correspondence starts
with the innocuous idea that whenever a sentence or a proposition is true,
they are true becausematters in theworld stands in certainways, andmatters
in the world are usually something external to sentences and propositions.
For example, we wish to say that
‘snow is white’ is true because snow is white
in other words
the fact that snow is white makes the sentence ‘snow is white’ true.
ese remarks, Horwich says, are totally coherent with deationism. In-
deed, from our knowledge and theories of the world we can deduce, and
thereby explain, that
snow is white
and from the corresponding instance of the disquotational schema we can
deduce, and thereby explain
‘snow is white’ is true.
erefore, the explicative dependence of truths upon facts is preservedwithin
deationism: snow’s being white explains the truth of ‘snow is white’. Ac-
cording to Horwich, then, deationism does not reject the view that truths
correspond to facts, but only the stronger view that truth consists in such
correspondence.
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I contend that we can provide an explanation of the semantic defective-
ness of sentences similar to the explanation, which Horwich suggests, of the
dependence of truths upon facts.e idea is that non-factualist philosophers
can deduce (i) that objects or properties of certain kinds do not exist from
their favourite picture of the world, (ii) that certain expressions do not have
truth-theoretic semantic value from the denitions of reference and ascrip-
tion and (iii) that the sentences that contain those expressions are semanti-
cally defective. For example, the philosopher who takes a non-factualist po-
sition in aesthetics can deduce that aesthetics properties do not exist from
his preferred metaphysics. From this, he can deduce, say, that
the property of being delicious does not exist.
en, from the denition of ascription, he can deduce that
‘is delicious’ does not ascribe any property.
Finally, he can deduce that
‘rhubarb is delicious’ is semantically defective.
ismodel of explanation does not assume any inationary view of semantic
notions. We do not need anything of robust in order to say what determines
whether all parts of a sentence have truth-theoretic semantic values or not.
Before closing this section, I want to address two further objections that
might be raised against my proposal. One objection is that my proposal is
not consistent with the use conception ofmeaning. Is not the use conception
committed to the view that all the instances of the disquotational schema are
constitutive of the meaning of the predicate ‘true’? In my view, the route for
replying to this objection is to keep distinct the account of the concept of
truth from the account of the property of truth.
It might be conceded that normal speakers, who possess the concept of
truth but are not experts, or philosophers, have the disposition to accept all
the instances of the disquotational schema, even those that are paradoxical,
pathological or semantically defective. In other words, it might be conceded
that this regularity of use is constitutive of the mastery of the concept of
truth. On the other hand, it should be recognised that this disposition to
use the truth predicate has to be regimented by the theory of the property
of truth. Aer all, there is common agreement that whatever Tarski was
attempting by his theory of truth in L, he was not giving the analysis of the
concept of truth in L and he was not looking for an expression synonymous
with ‘truth in L’ either.11 Although we cannot take the Tarskian theory to
11 For a discussion of this point see Kirkham (1995, ch. 6).
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oer an analysis of the concept of truth in L or of the meaning of ‘true in L’,
we can still regard it as a theory of the property of truth in L.
Besides, even the claim that competent speakers manifest the tendency
to accept all the instances of the disquotational schema is not as solid as it
might appear. Maybe they have such tendency when they are in an unre-
ective mood. However, it does not take very long to disclose the semantic
paradoxes to competent speakers or to make their intuitions vacillate asking
them whether it is really true that Santa Claus wears a red suit. e advan-
tage of a theory of the property of truth in L as distinct from an account of
the mastery of the concept of truth in L is that it provides a way for regi-
menting the dispositions of speakers. But this aspect need not be in contrast
with the view that speakers’ dispositions are constitutive of the mastery of
concepts (meanings).
e other related objection is the following. e truth predicate func-
tions as a device for endorsing (i) assertions of sentences whose content
might be unspecied and (ii) assertions of whole classes of sentences, as
when one asserts ‘what Johnwill assert tomorrow is true’ or ‘everything John
asserts is true’. If non-factualists do not apply the truth predicate to sentences
in certain regions of discourse they will lack a device for endorsing both the
assertion of the sentences in those regions whose content they are not able
to specify and the assertion of whole classes of sentences. My reply to this
objection is that from the premise that the truth-predicate is not available to
non-factualists as a device for endorsing assertions in certain regions of dis-
course, the conclusion does not follow that non-factualists do not have any
other device for endorsing such assertions. It has been argued12 that ‘true’
and ‘warrantedly assertible’ have the same positive normative force: any rea-
son to regard a sentence as warrantedly assertible is a reason to endorse the
assertion of the sentence.en, non-factualists can identify the correctness
of sentences in non-factual regions of discoursewith the notion ofwarranted
assertibility or a notion characterised in terms of warranted assertibility, like
for example the notion of superassertibility.13 ey can employ such notion
to state the following schema:
If ⌜p⌝ is warrantedly assertible (superassertible), then p
Instances of the schemamight be used to form arguments like the following:
Everything John asserts is warrantedly assertible (superassertible).
John asserts ‘act A is wrong’.
12 Cf. Wright (1992, 18).
13 I borrow the notion of superassertibility from Wright (1992), although Wright proposes
superassertibility as a notion of truth.
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erefore
act A is wrong.
In conclusion, non-factualists can employ a predicates like ‘warrantedly as-
sertible’ or ‘superassertible’ as a device for endorsing assertions of seman-
tically defective sentences and restrict the application of ‘true’ to sentences
that are fact stating.
In the following section, I will address some objections to the Tarskian
theory of the property of truth in L. I take such objections to be relevant
to the discussion in this paper not only because they threaten directly the
Tarskian approach and the version of deationism that I have been argu-
ing for is a modied Tarskian theory, but also because my replies to them
will reveal the fundamental role that the use conception of meaning plays
in my defence of the claim that standard non-factualism is consistent with
deationism.
4. Further objections and replies
e literature oers several arguments against the Tarskian theory of truth
in L. In this section, I will consider some of them. e role of the use con-
ception of meaning will turn out fundamental in my replies.ere are three
main objections to the Tarskian theory of truth in L:14
(1) e Tarskian truth predicates and the ordinary truth predicate have
dierent modal properties, even when the ordinary truth predicate
is restricted to particular languages.15
(2) e Tarskian truth predicates dier in meaning from the ordinary
truth predicate, even when the ordinary truth predicate is restricted
to particular languages.16
(3) e ordinary notion of truth can play a substantial role in theories
of meaning, whereas the Tarskian notion of truth cannot.
Objection (1) holds that the ordinary truth predicate and the Tarskian truth
predicates have dierent modal properties. We can reconstruct the objec-
tion in the following way: for the sake of exposition imagine a language
L containing only two sentences: ‘Der mond ist blau’ and ‘Der Schnee ist
weiss’. e Tarskian denition of truth in L can be simplied by specifying
enumeratively what it is for each sentence to be truth:
14 Cf. Soames (1997, 22).
15 Etchemendy (1988), Putnam (1994) and Soames (1997) raise this objection.
16 Soames (1997) and Künne (2003, 224) raise this objection.
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(a) For any x (x is true in L if and only if ((x = ‘Der mond ist blau’ and
themoon is blue) or (x = ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ and snow is white))).
If we consider the sentence ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’, from (a) we obtain:
(b) ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true in L if and only if ((‘Der Schnee ist
weiss’ = ‘Der Mond ist blau’ and the moon is blue) or (‘Der Schnee
ist weiss’ = ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ and snow is white)).
e right-hand side of (b) is logically equivalent to the sentence ‘snow is
white’. erefore, the sentence ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ satises the Tarskian
truth predicate, in every possible world in which snow is white. However,
the objection goes, the sentence ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ satises the ordinary
truth-predicate, even in those possible worlds in which it means, say, that
water is liquid and water is liquid and snow is not white. And it is not true
in those possible worlds in which it means, say, that the earth is cubical and
the earth is not cubical and snow is white.
My claim is that objection (1) rests on (i) a misunderstanding of the
Tarskian theory and (ii) the assumption that the ordinary truth predicate
is dened over strings of sounds/marks, which are individuated in virtue of
their phonological, morphological and syntactical characteristics. I will ar-
gue that such assumption begs the question against the use conception of
meaning.
(i)e Objection overlooks the fact that the Tarskian theory gives an ab-
solute denition of truth in L.17 One of the essential features of the Tarskian
theory is that the meanings of the expressions of L are taken as xed. e
possible worlds in which, say, ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ means that water is liq-
uid and water is liquid and snow is not white are not possible worlds in
which ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ does not satises the Tarskian truth predicate.
ose are worlds in which speakers do not speak L, since they use the string
of sounds/marks ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ with a dierent meaning from the
meaning it has in L.e point is that the Tarskian theory does not give the
account of truth for mere strings of sounds/marks, which are individuated
only in virtue of their phonological, morphological and syntactic character-
istics. Rather, it gives the account of truth for expressions, which are strings
of sounds/marks endowed with their meanings. e claim, then, is that se-
mantic properties are essential properties of linguistic expressions, whereas
they cannot be essential properties of strings of sounds/marks.ere are no
possible worlds in which the expressions of a language have semantic prop-
erties dierent from the semantic properties they have in the actual world,
17 See for example Künne (2003, 220–221), Patterson (2002, 2003), Carpintero (1996) and
Davies (1981, 28).
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although there might be possible worlds in which dierent languages, with
dierent expression, are spoken.
(ii) One might try to renew the objection by claiming that we need to
dene truth over strings of sounds/marks, which are individuated only in
virtue of phonological, morphological and syntactic characteristics. is
claim assumes that semantic properties call for an explanation other than
the account provided by the Tarskian theory. is explanation should be
the product of empirical investigation. Perhaps semantic properties need to
be explained through a physicalistic reduction. In this sense, the objection
seems to be reduced to the claim that an account of semantic properties that
does not make them vary from one possible world to another in accordance
with the change of speakers’ linguistic behaviour, is bound to fail. My reply
to this claim is that the view that the semantic properties of the expressions
of a language vary from one possible world to another in accordance with
speakers’ linguistic behaviour takes it for granted that a theory of truthmust
address the following question:18
(Q) In virtue of what facts regarding speakers’ linguistic behaviour do
the emissions of certain strings of sounds/marks have the property
of truth?
e answer, then, is to be discovered by empirical investigation. However,
according to my picture, a theory of truth need not be taken to address the
question (Q). Rather, it should be taken to answer the following question:
(Q*) What are the semantic properties of the expressions of L?
Certainly, to answer this question we need to investigate L-speakers’ linguis-
tic behaviour. Yet, the investigation of linguistic behaviour comes into play
at the level of the identication of the language spoken and, more precisely,
of the meanings of the strings of sounds/marks uttered.us, empirical in-
vestigation comes into play to answer the question:
(Q**) In virtue of what facts regarding speakers’ linguistic behaviour do
certain strings of sounds/marks have certain meanings?
In order to answer question (Q**) in accordance with the use conception of
meaning we do not need any reductive analysis of truth-theoretic seman-
tic notions, because, as we said in section 2, a theory of meaning inspired
by the use conception does not employ truth-theoretic notions. In conclu-
sion, objection (1) works on the assumption that the ordinary truth predi-
cate is dened not over expressions, which are individuated in virtue of their
18 Soames (1984) himself makes the distinctions between (Q) and (Q*) and says that a
Tarskian theory of truth in L addresses question (Q*).
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meanings and carry their semantic properties essentially, but over strings of
sounds/marks, which are individuated in virtue of their phonological, mor-
phological and syntactic characteristics. However, the rationale for making
that assumption begs the question against the use conception of meaning.
Objection (2) says that the ordinary predicate ‘true in L’ (that is the or-
dinary truth predicate restricted to the sentences of a given language L) and
the Tarskian truth predicates are epistemically dierent. For the sake of ex-
position, let us deal again with a language L containing only two sentences:
‘Die Erde bewegt sich’ and ‘Der Mond ist rund’. As in the previous case, we
can specify enumeratively what it is for each sentence to be true:
(c) For any x (x is true in L if and only if ((x = ‘Die Erde bewegt sich’
and the earth moves) or (x = ‘Der Mond ist rund’ and the moon is
round))).
Now, compare the following two sentences:
(d) ‘Der Mond ist rund’ is true in L if and only if the moon is round
and
(e) ((‘DerMond ist rund’ = ‘Die Erde bewegt sich’ and the earthmoves)
or (‘Der Mond ist rund’ = ‘Der Mond ist rund’ and the moon is
round)) if and only if the moon is round.
(e) is obtained by substituting “‘Der Mond is rund” is true in L’ in (d) with
the deniens we get from (c).
e objection is that (d) and (e) have dierent epistemic properties, since
the knowledge of (d) is sucient to justify the belief that the sentence ‘Der
Mond ist rund’ does not mean that the earth moves. By contrast, the knowl-
edge of (e) does not give any information about the meaning of that sen-
tence. e conclusion is that the ordinary truth predicate and the Tarskian
truth predicates are epistemically dierent, since the former can justify be-
liefs about the meanings of sentences, whereas the latter cannot.
My reply to objection (2) is that it assumes, like in objection (1), that
the Tarskian truth predicates are dened over strings of sounds/marks. It
overlooks that (e) is derived from (c) and that if one understands (c) as the
Tarskian account of truth in L, which is a necessary condition for deduc-
ing (e), then he will know that ‘Der Mond ist rund’ means that the moon
is round and does not mean that the earth moves, because variables in (c)
range over sentences endowedwith theirmeanings. In other words, in order
to formulate and understand (c) as the Tarskian account of truth in L, one
needs to know that ‘DerMond ist rund’ means that themoon is round, since
he needs (i) to know that the object-language sentence ‘Der Mond ist rund’
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is correctly translated into the metalanguage sentence ‘the moon is round’
and (ii) to understand the metalanguage sentence ‘the moon is round’.
I take objection (3) simply to beg the question against the philosophical
position that combines the Tarskian approach to truth with the use concep-
tion of meaning. As argued in section 2, the Tarskian theory of truth in L
requires the notion of meaning. On pain of circularity, that notion cannot
be the truth-theoretic one. erefore, the conclusion that the Tarskian no-
tion of truth cannot have any theoretical role in theory of meaning by itself
does not undermine the Tarskian approach. Certainly, we should agree on
the conditional claim that if the notion of truth really is required in theory of
meaning, then the Tarskian theory cannot be taken as an adequate account
of truth. But advocates of the use conception ofmeaning take the antecedent
of the conditional to be false.
5. Conclusions
I argued that the standard formulation of non-factualism is consistent with
deationism, in contrast to the view held by some philosophers who are de-
ationists and urge a reformulation of non-factualism.
e version of deationism I presented in a sketch is amodied Tarskian
theory of truth in L that allows for truth-value gaps. Semantically defec-
tive sentences are neither true nor false and do not have a descriptive role.
I argued that such theory is Tarskian and deationary because it proceeds
by enumerative denitions and avoids conceptual analysis or reduction of
primitive semantic notions.
e defence of my claim assumed the use conception of meaning. is
brought out an interesting consequence, because many of those philoso-
phers who call for a reformulation of non-factualism embrace the use con-
ception ofmeaning, i.e. PaulHorwich.e use conception ofmeaning turned
out fundamental since (i) it provides an account of synonymy and (ii) avoids
truth-theoretic notions. ese aspects are important because the Tarskian
approach requires the notion of sameness of meaning that, on pain of circu-
larity, cannot be based on the truth-theoretic conception of meaning. e
use conception of meaning turned out fundamental also in replying to some
widespread objections to the Tarskian approach.
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